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Iran, the Status Quo Power
MOHSEN M. MILANI
Not since 1979, when a popular revolutionbrought the ayatollahs to the pinnacles ofpower, has the Islamic Republic of Iran
faced as many opportunities and imminent threats
as it does today. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of
the revolution, the future of Iran’s popular reform
movement is at stake. Regionally, the fall of Sad-
dam Hussein has eliminated a major threat, while
also opening new doors for Iran to potentially
expand its influence in Iraq. Yet the emerging
strategic configuration has also heightened Tehran’s
perception of threat, with the United States now a
presence in two countries that share borders with
Iran: Iraq and Afghanistan. 
THE REFORMERS’ LOST MOMENT
In 1997, Mohammad Khatami won the presi-
dential election by a landslide, receiving more than
20 million votes, or 69 percent of the total. He had
shrewdly transformed the election into a referen-
dum for or against freedom, and freedom won. He
pledged to make the Islamic Republic freer, more
transparent, and subservient to the people. His tri-
umph generated both “irrational exuberance”
among those who naively believed there to be a
short-cut to democracy, and lingering hysteria
among the conservatives, who viewed Khatami as
a reformist reincarnation of Mikhail Gorbachev in
turban and robe who would inadvertently trigger
the collapse of the Islamic Republic. Eight years
later, neither the hope nor the fear has materialized.
Today, the reform movement has lost its original
popularity and vibrancy. Although deteriorating
economic conditions have contributed to this
decline, it was a host of political, constitutional, and
tactical factors that rendered the movement inef-
fective. In particular, Khatami’s tactics were unsuit-
able for his strategic goal; he sought to change the
nature of the relationship between the ruled and the
rulers without destabilizing the system or revising
the constitution. This was tantamount to a declara-
tion of ideological war against the status quo forces,
a war Khatami was unprepared to win. 
This ideological war revolved around two oppos-
ing paradigms of Islamic governance. One
paradigm, embraced by the conservatives, is based
on “limited popular sovereignty,” the boundaries of
which the faqih (supreme leader) alone defines. In
Iran’s bifurcated governing system, the Islamic
(unelected) component was designed to dominate
the republican (elected) component, which
includes the parliament (Majles) and presidency.
Thus, the faqih is the ultimate source of power
within the system, and the 12 appointed members
of the Guardian Council can veto any legislation
passed by the Majles, as well as reject the creden-
tials of any candidates running for office. In the
other paradigm, supported by Khatami and the
reformists, popular, not limited sovereignty is the
essence of governance. Khatami argues that Islam
and democracy are compatible and complementary
ideals, and that no authority can deprive the people
from enjoying the divine gift of freedom.
From the beginning of the reform movement,
the balance of power figured decisively and con-
sistently in favor of the conservatives. The conser-
vatives enjoyed the support of about 25 to 30
percent of the electorate; they controlled the major
institutions, such as the Majles, the Guardian
Council, the security forces, and the television and
radio networks; and they were also allies of the
supreme leader. The reformists’ only institutional
base of power was the presidency. 
Khatami, however, had a substantial degree of
soft power. He had won the hearts and minds of a
significant portion of the population, particularly
women, the modern middle class, and the young,
most of whom were disgusted with the Islamic
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“Iran appears ready to discuss the future of Iraq as well as other security issues
with the United States. It remains uncertain for Tehran whether a ‘tactical con-
sensus’ on Iraq could . . . lead to a marked improvement in US-Iran relations.”
Republic’s imposition of a harsh Islamic code of
behavior and morality. This enormous reservoir of
support, which allowed the reformists to win con-
trol of the Majles in 2000, was never institutional-
ized. It is true that reformists created a major party,
the Participation Front of Islamic Iran, but they
failed to open the political process to Islamic and
secular nationalist groups.
The reformists also failed to show tactical pru-
dence when they alienated the former president,
Hashemi Rafsanjani, pushing him into forming an
alliance with the conservatives. The savvy Rafsan-
jani was chair of the Expediency Council—the
body responsible for settling disputes between the
Majles and the Guardian Council—and was a
prized asset, since that body could help to pass
reform initiatives vetoed by the Guardian Council.
THE CONSERVATIVES’ ARSENAL
While the reformists made numerous tactical
mistakes, the conservatives used every weapon in
their arsenal to undermine the reform movement.
The Guardian Council rejected the credentials of
reformist candidates running for political office and
blocked executive orders and legislation that it
deemed menacing. The state-run radio and televi-
sion networks provided critical support as the pow-
erful judiciary, which had its own security forces,
opened a frontal assault on reformist journalists.
Khatami’s signature initiative of expanding freedom
of the press was all but shattered when his oppo-
nents shut down more newspapers and imprisoned
more journalists than they had before he became
president. Some of the leaders of the reform move-
ment were imprisoned as well, including Hashem
Aqajari, an Islamic thinker whose scathing critique
of the political and religious roles of the clerics has
earned him considerable popularity—and the accu-
sation of denigrating and defaming Islam.
Finally, security issues, not the imperative of
reform, have been the top priority of the Iranian
elites for the past four years, and this in turn has
strengthened the conservatives. In June 1999, a
group of angry students demonstrated in Tehran
against the closing of a pro-reform newspaper. Vig-
ilante groups, aided by government security forces,
stormed the students’ dormitories and scores of stu-
dents were injured. When the demonstrations
became violent, Khatami called for an end to the
protests; he was reportedly given a stern warning
by the Revolutionary Guards to curb the activities
of his supporters. From that point onward, Khatami
became more sensitive about security issues and
increasingly suspicious of possible foreign inter-
vention to foment instability within Iran. 
International events beyond Iran’s control further
pushed security issues to the top of the agenda. The
US “war on terror” and the presence of American
troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq, along with
Washington’s talk of “regime change” in Tehran,
made the survival and security of the Islamic
Republic the principal preoccupation of the elites.
This change in priorities was also evident in
Khatami, who talked less about reform and more
about security issues in the past three years than
during his first term in office. 
The conservatives took maximum advantage of
this heightened threat perception and decided to
end the debilitating political gridlock. In the par-
liamentary elections of 2003, the Guardian Coun-
cil reviewed the applications of 8,172 parliamentary
candidates and rejected 3,183, most of whom were
reformists. As a result, the conservatives won 189
of the 290 seats in parliamentary elections that saw
one of the lowest voter turnouts in recent years.
Today, the conservatives control all major organs of
government except for the presidency, and they
could potentially win the presidential elections
scheduled for May 2005. 
REFORM AND THE SILENT MAJORITY
Now that the conservatives are in control, does
this mean that the reform movement has been a
total failure? Hardly. The reform movement has left
indelible fingerprints all over the political land-
scape. Khatami helped enrich the country’s intel-
lectual milieu, and popularized the elementary
vocabulary of democracy in a land long accustomed
to autocracy and despotism. Under inhospitable
conditions, the media continue to thrive, and there
has been a discernible relaxation of the activities of
the “moral police” as well as government cultural
and social policies. Any frequent traveler to the
country can see the huge and mainly positive social
and cultural differences between the Iran of 2005
and the Iran of 1997. 
Focusing only on the political competition
between factions, one might mourn the premature
decline of the reformists. From the perspective of
civil society, a much more promising picture emerges.
Khatami did not create the reform movement; he
simply articulated some of the needs and aspirations
of a vibrant civil society that reflects a majority of the
Iranian public. Today, many of the needs and goals
of this majority have not been addressed, which has
led to widespread passivity, frustration, and anger.
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One of the Islamic Revolution’s legacies, however, is
the institutionalization of elections and Iranian soci-
ety’s acceptance of them as the preferable method for
resolving conflicts. And it is this silent majority that
will continue to determine the outcome of elections
in coming years, as all factions will continue to com-
pete to win its support and represent its interests.
Any electoral manipulation to suppress this major-
ity could result in instability.
The most promising component of this silent
majority is the under-30 generation. Today, approx-
imately 43 percent of Iran’s population of 68 million
is under the age of 30, with no memory of the 1979
revolution. There are 2 million students in institu-
tions of higher education, and 4 million recent col-
lege graduates. Interestingly, the percentage of
women in Iranian universities is now greater than
that of male students. While adult literacy is about
85 percent and 71 percent for males and females
respectively, the rates are 95 and 92 percent for those
between 15 and 24 years of age. This highly educated
generation is Iran’s
future.
No solid studies
of the orientations
of this generation
have been pub-
lished. What we
do know is anec-
dotal and impressionistic. While a small portion
remains politically active, a much larger segment is
passive and mainly preoccupied with bread-and-
butter issues. Yet, a new concept of freedom is grad-
ually spreading among this young generation.
Unlike the revolutionary generation in power today,
which defined freedom as liberation from Western
domination, this generation views freedom as both
liberation from foreign domination and defense of
the individual’s inalienable right to live as he or she
wishes. The individual is becoming the starting
point of a new, albeit unstructured political dis-
course that is bound to become more coherent and
refined in the future.
Nationalistic sentiments are also resurfacing—
evidenced by the remarkable popularity of pre-
Islamic names—even as religion is becoming an
increasingly private matter for this generation.
Unlike Ataturk in Turkey and the two Pahlavi kings
in Iran who imposed a top-down style of secular-
ization, the idea of secularization is now spreading
from the bottom up. 
Despite widespread discontent, the state remains
stable. Those who believe in the imminent collapse
of the Islamic Republic underestimate its resiliency
and misconstrue the nature of the popular discon-
tent. Having experienced a revolution and a bloody
war with Iraq, Iran’s silent majority has reached a
remarkable maturity, favoring reform and peace
over revolution and violence. Unless it is presented
with a clear and preferable alternative to the status
quo, this group will provide stability to Iran and
will in its own unique way force the Islamic Repub-
lic to reform itself. In other words, while the reform
movement may be terminally ill, reformism is alive
and well, and is the emerging trend in Iranian polit-
ical thought and action. 
IN SEARCH OF STABILITY
While domestic reform has proceeded slowly,
changes in Iranian foreign policy have been more
expeditious and substantive. Washington continues
to perceive Iran as a revolutionary force bent on
undermining US allies and exporting its revolution-
ary ideals. This was a fairly accurate description of
Iran in the 1980s,
when winning the
war against Iraq
and exporting rev-
olution were its
twin goals. Today,
the situation is
radically different.
Since the end of Iraq-Iran War in 1988, Iran has
gradually transformed itself from a revolutionary
power into a regional status quo power in a quest to
create spheres of influence. Recognizing this change
could have profound ramifications for US policy
toward Iran. 
After the Iraq war, Iran became convinced that
it lacked the power to export its revolution and
made economic reconstruction its top priority.
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 accelerated Iran’s
transformation into a status quo power. During the
crisis, Iran pursued “active neutrality,” staying on
the sidelines and avoiding any military involve-
ment in the conflict, while indirectly helping the
United States remove Iraq from Kuwait. Iran main-
tained its neutrality even during the mini-civil war
that erupted in Iraq after its expulsion from
Kuwait. While the Iraqi army slaughtered rebel-
lious Kurds and Shiites, Iran, like the US-led allied
forces, remained silent. That silence was the sym-
bolic burial of the revolutionary phase of Iranian
foreign policy. 
Shortly after the Kuwaiti crisis, the Soviet Union
disintegrated, creating enticing and historic oppor-
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Those who believe in the imminent collapse of the
Islamic Republic underestimate its resiliency and
misconstrue the nature of the popular discontent.
tunities for Iran in the newly formed independent
states of the former Soviet Union, many of which
shared deep commonalities with Iran. 
Instead of exporting revolution, Iran is now more
interested in regional stability and commercial
activities. Its ultimate strategic goal is to become a
major economic power and hub for the transit of
goods and services between the Persian Gulf and
Afghanistan, and possibly even China. 
It is ironic that US policies have also helped trans-
form Iran into a regional power. First, the United
States overthrew the Taliban with the assistance of the
Northern Alliance, an Afghan coalition of Dari-
Persian speaking forces that was formed with Iranian
assistance and received generous Iranian support. Iran
even indirectly cooperated with the United States to
liberate Afghanistan. It announced that it would pro-
vide sanctuary to distressed US military personnel
inside Iranian territory. Iranian advisers rubbed shoul-
ders with American military personnel in the region
controlled by the Northern Alliance. Once the Taliban
were overthrown, Iran developed close relations with
the pro-American government of Hamid Karzai and
became heavily engaged in the reconstruction of
Afghanistan, especially in the Herat region. 
More consequential than the fall of the Taliban
was the collapse of Saddam Hussein, Iran’s main
nemesis. Thanks to the United States, the single
greatest threat to Iran was eliminated, and Iran’s role
as the most powerful indigenous force in the Per-
sian Gulf has been solidified. 
NEIGHBORLY CONNECTIONS
Iran is an influential player in Iraq and shares
deep historical and cultural ties with that country.
Iran and Iraq are the only two countries in the
world where Shiism is the majority religion (95 per-
cent of Iranians are Shiite and at least 60 percent of
Iraqis are). Iran has well-entrenched relations with
the Shiite ulema (clerical) establishment in Iraq.
There is also a substantial population of Iraqi Shi-
ites of Iranian lineage who live in southern Iraq.
After the fall of Saddam, thousands of Iranians,
including many who had been exiled by Saddam,
flocked to Iraq.
Iran has powerful political connections in Iraq
with the al-Dawa party and the Supreme Council of
Iraq’s Islamic Revolution (created by Iran in the
early 1980s) and with the latter’s nearly 10,000 Ira-
nian-trained armed militia members, the Badr
Brigade. Iran also appears to have good relations
with the militant Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. And
it enjoys friendly relations with the two major Kur-
dish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and
the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, and with
Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress. (Once
the favorite of the Pentagon, his group had offices
in Tehran supported by US funds.) Iranian radio and
television programs, aired in Arabic from Iran, are
popular in southern Iraq. 
Despite these assets, Iran’s role in Iraq should not
be exaggerated. Neither should the vitriolic decla-
rations of a few demagogues in Tehran be confused
with its actual policy. Three factors will continue to
limit Iran’s influence in Iraq: the United States is a
powerful impediment to Iran’s ambitions; as Iran
learned during the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq’s Shiites are
Iraqis first and Shiite second; and Iraqi nationalists
harbor deep suspicions of the Persians and would
oppose Iranian interference. 
It is also crucial to distinguish between Iran’s pol-
icy and the role played by the informal Shiite ulema
networks created centuries ago in Iran, Iraq, and
Lebanon. Distinguishing where one network begins
and the others end is not easy: Iraq’s Ayatollah Ali
Sistani, for example, is Iranian-born while Ayatol-
lah Shahroudi, the head of Iran’s judiciary, is Iraqi-
born. It is exceptionally difficult to establish how
much control, if any, the Iranian government or
Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, exer-
cises over these networks. 
The policy of the Iranian government likely will
continue to evolve as facts on the ground change.
Uncertain about Iraq’s future, Iran is keeping its
options open, avoiding antagonizing any major
Iraqi force, and sailing along the tip of whatever is
the current wave of public mood in Iraq.
WHAT TEHRAN WANTS IN IRAQ
Iran pursues four main goals in Iraq. Its pri-
mary objective is to prevent the establishment of
an anti-Iran, Sunni-dominated regime in Baghdad.
Iran is worried about the resurgence of the
Baathist party and the US decision to retain mem-
bers of the “Iran Section” of Saddam’s Mokhaberat
(intelligence service) who could reignite old hos-
tilities with Iran. Tehran has been pleased, so far,
with the two post-Saddam governments. And it
does not fear the establishment of a democratic
Iraqi state, however improbable that eventuality.
Turkey, another neighbor of Iran, is democratic
and a member of NATO, and it has had no impact
on Iran’s internal politics. Why would the case of a
“democratic Iraq” be any different? 
A second priority for Iran is to support the Shi-
ite awakening in Iraq. Since the 1979 Islamic revo-
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lution, there has been a resurgence of the histori-
cally repressed Shiites in Lebanon, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and now Iraq. Thanks to the US destruc-
tion of Saddam’s “republic of fear,” millions of
oppressed Shiites have been liberated and ener-
gized. Iran is determined to support and sustain this
liberation. This is why Iran, like the United States,
has consistently called for free national elections,
convinced that the Shia will emerge victorious. 
This is not to suggest that Tehran’s agenda today
is to push for an Iranian-style Shiite theocracy in
Iraq. However, any partitioning of Iraq could
change this policy. Iran is aware that the large and
vocal Sunni and Kurdish populations would vio-
lently oppose the creation of any Shiite theocracy.
In fact, Iran is much more concerned about the
prospect of jihadists and Wahhabi fundamentalists
fomenting sectarian conflicts between the Shiites
and Sunnis, which could drag Iran into the fray. 
Iran has also given rhetorical support to the Iraqi
insurgency, although its policy is shrouded in
secrecy. It is unlikely
that Iran has provided
any logistical support to
the Sunni insurgents.
The case of the Shiite
insurgency, which has
subsided considerably
in recent months, is different. Tehran denies any
involvement, although some Iraqi officials have
accused Iran of providing weapons to Muqtada al-
Sadr’s Mahdi Army. Iran has clearly avoided con-
demning both Muqtada and the Sunni insurgency,
partly because Tehran recognizes Muqtada’s popu-
larity among the Shiites and views him as a coun-
terforce to the moderate Ayatollah Sistani; partly
because the insurgency opposes the US occupation;
and partly because Iran would like to endear the
Sunni forces to its side.
Iran has praised the insurgency as a national lib-
eration movement and “the beginning of a new
Intifada against foreign aggressors.” It appears that
Tehran supports the Shiite insurgency as long as it
does not generate a violent reaction by the United
States. It was in that spirit that Iran sent a delega-
tion in mid-2004 to mediate the dispute between
coalition forces and Muqtada (which resulted in the
assassination of an Iranian official). 
Iran’s third goal is to ensure Iraq’s territorial
integrity and prevent its Balkanization. Aside
from the danger of civil conflict in the region,
Iran will not tolerate an autonomous Kurdistan 
in Iraq. The creation of a Kurdish state would
undoubtedly entice ethnic groups in Iran to
demand their own autonomy. 
Finally, Iran is eager to engage in Iraq’s recon-
struction. It would like to expand its influence in
the Shiite holy cities of Iraq, as it has done in Herat. 
The collapse of Saddam has created additional
challenges for Iran. The biggest is preventing the
United States from building permanent military
bases in Iraq. To establish bases, the United States
would have to request formal Iraqi permission. Iran
could easily increase its propaganda and call on the
Iraqis to denounce what might be labeled a “capit-
ulation agreement.” Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s
denunciation of a similar agreement signed between
Iran and the United States in 1963 generated con-
siderable popularity for him. 
Another source of concern for Tehran is the pos-
sible manipulation of the Mojahedin-e Khaleq as
mercenaries to destabilize Iran. The Mojahedin,
which was supported by Saddam and operated from
Iraq, is now under direct US control. Tehran, like the
United States, consid-
ers this organization 
a terrorist entity. The
United States, however,
has refused requests to
extradite members of
the group to Tehran,
leading Iran to accuse Washington of hypocrisy and
inconsistency in conducting its “war on terrorism.”
Iran, which is holding some Al Qaeda members
who escaped from Afghanistan during the war
against the Taliban, would like to use this Al Qaeda
“card” as leverage to strike a deal with Washington
about the Mojahedin.
Another challenge for Iran is the future of the
Qom-Najaf corridor. The seminaries in Iraq histori-
cally have had an important impact on Iranian poli-
tics. It was from Najaf, for example, that Ayatollah
Khomeini delivered his historic lectures to legitimize
the establishment of an Islamic government based on
the clerics’ direct rule, or the velayat-e faqih. Today,
there are those in Iran, including some clerics, who
either seek to democratize or altogether reject this
doctrine; these voices are often suppressed. With a
revived and powerful seminary in Najaf, this situa-
tion could reverse. Ayatollah Sistani belongs to the
“quietist” school of Shiism, which rejects Khomeini’s
interpretation of the velayat-e faqih. A Najaf seminary
unfriendly to Iran’s version of the velayat-e faqih doc-
trine would be a long-term concern of the Iranian
regime. It is important to note, however, that it
would be unlikely for a non-Iranian ayatollah in
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It is ironic that US policies have also helped
transform Iran into a regional power.
Najaf or elsewhere to influence events in Iran. More-
over, both the Qom and Mashhad seminaries in Iran
have greater resources available to them than Najaf
does, which means that they could influence Najaf
more than Najaf could influence them.
WASHINGTON AND TEHRAN
The chaotic conditions in Iraq provide a unique
opportunity for a rapprochement between the
United States and Iran. At first, the stunningly
quick US victory amplified the fears of the ruling
ayatollahs that Iran, as a member of the “axis of
evil,” could be the next target of American wrath.
However, the ferocity of the Iraqi insurgency has
convinced Tehran that a US invasion of Iran is no
longer feasible. In fact, a consensus has developed
in Tehran that, if Iran avoids any direct confronta-
tions with the United States, potential new oppor-
tunities in Iraq outweigh potential threats. Iran
seems to have concluded that it can develop a “tac-
tical consensus” with the United States in Iraq, as it
did in Afghanistan. The prevailing sentiment is that
the United States has slipped into a quagmire in
Iraq. Escape will require an arrangement with
Tehran, which could become the prelude to direct
bilateral negotiations. 
So far Iran has not actively sought to undermine
the United States in Iraq. Most regional specialists
agree that Iran could make things much more dif-
ficult for the United States if it so desired. One fac-
tor that could alter Iranian behavior is how the
United States addresses Iran’s heightened threat per-
ception. The equation is rather straightforward:
more American threats and no incentives will equal
greater temptations for Iran to undermine the
United States in Iraq and elsewhere. 
Addressing Iran’s security concerns will give
incentives to Iran to cooperate with the United
States. Washington could simply ignore Iran and
continue with its current policy; the imprudence of
such a course becomes apparent if we place Iraq
within the context of the security of the Persian Gulf
region. The stability of the oil-rich Persian Gulf
remains, after all, a top strategic US objective. The
United States could try unilaterally to maintain
regional stability—a questionable strategy that would
be hugely expensive and ultimately unsustainable.
The prospect of the United States’ relying on the
Arab countries in the region is not promising,
either. The daunting task of building a unified and
relatively strong Iraq will take years. Saudi Arabia,
with its weak army and small population, is hardly
in a better position to make a decisive contribution
to the region’s stability. Today, that fragile kingdom
must contain the threat posed by Al Qaeda and
grapple with the succession of its aging leadership.
The other littoral sheikhdoms are too powerless to
become serious regional players. 
Marginalizing Iran, the region’s oldest, most pop-
ulous, and most stable state, would be a mistake.
The history of the past four decades shows that
when the United States, the world’s superpower,
and Iran, an emerging regional power, have been at
peace, the Persian Gulf enjoys stability. When the
two nations have not been at peace, the region has
not been, either.
IRAN AND THE BOMB
A key impediment to improving US-Iran relations
is Iran’s nuclear energy programs. Iran, as a signa-
tory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the
treaty’s Additional Protocol, which calls for intru-
sive safeguards, claims that it has the sovereign and
legal right to engage in peaceful nuclear research
and development, subject to inspections by the
International Atomic Energy Agency. Iran has con-
sistently insisted that its nuclear programs are solely
for peaceful ends and that it has no intention or
existing program to develop nuclear weapons. The
government has even suggested that using nuclear
weapons is religiously forbidden.
Still, there is a debate in Iran about the wisdom
of developing nuclear bombs. There are those who
believe that a nuclear Iran will become more vul-
nerable than a non-nuclear Iran. A group of Majles
deputies, for example, is drafting legislation to ban
the building of nuclear weapons. There are also
those who believe that Iran lives in a dangerous and
nuclearized region, and that a nuclear Iran is the
best deterrent against its enemies. There is total
consensus, however, that Iran should develop its
civilian nuclear programs. The government is capi-
talizing on this popular sentiment by arguing that
the United States is determined to stop Iran from
developing civilian nuclear energy. 
Washington has consistently accused Iran of
deceiving the international community and of har-
boring a surreptitious nuclear program. The Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency has thus far not
found any evidence that Iran is building nuclear
weapons. It has, however, criticized Iran for a lack
of transparency and for not voluntarily reporting
some of its activities and facilities. 
Recently, two options on how best to deal with
Iran’s nuclear ambitions have received prominent
attention. The first is “regime change,” which is not
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realistic and could be counterproductive. The
Islamic Republic is a stable regime and is not in any
imminent danger of collapsing. Nor is there a viable
political alternative to it. The Islamic Republic has
proved much more effective in ensuring its survival
than in governing, and it operates more efficiently
when under the pressure of threats. It should also
be noted that the 1979 revolution and 1979 Tehran
hostage crisis were reactions to the 1953 CIA-staged
coup, which overthrew Mohammad Mossadeq and
secured Mohammed Reza Shah’s return to power. It
would be a mistake to revisit that era again. 
The second option, a preemptive strike, is not
attractive either. The United States could carry out
a preemptive air strike against known Iranian
nuclear and missile-building facilities; it could
surely also bomb the Revolutionary Guards’ camps.
But Iran’s major nuclear facilities are spread
throughout the country, which would make it dif-
ficult to destroy all the facilities at once. Another
problem is that the United States does not seem to
know a great deal about Iran’s nuclear programs
and facilities.
There is the problem, too, of America’s “credibil-
ity deficit”—the result of its faulty intelligence and
failure to find any weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq. To win the international community’s support
for a preemptive strike against Iran, the United
States would need to provide hard evidence that
Iran is in fact building weapons of mass destruc-
tion. Even if Washington sees no obligation to sat-
isfy the international community, the costs and
unintended consequences of a preemptive strike
would be exorbitant. Military or unconventional
retaliation by Iran cannot be ruled out, especially
with some 150,000 US troops in Iraq and Afghani-
stan. Tehran also has some leverage in Iraq,
Lebanon, Afghanistan, and in the Persian Gulf that
it could manipulate to complicate matters for the
United States. Moreover, any preemptive strike is
likely to unify Iran, strengthen the conservatives,
and generate anti-Americanism—and this in a
country where the perception of the United States
today is considerably more favorable than in most
other Islamic countries. When Saddam invaded Iran
in 1980 to destabilize the new revolutionary gov-
ernment, the exact opposite occurred: the country
rallied behind the Ayatollah Khomeini and the
Islamic Republic grew more unified. 
For the Bush administration, negotiation would
be a much more effective and less costly method of
dealing with Iran than military intervention. The
Europeans have already started to negotiate with
Tehran about its nuclear plans and programs. In the
past two years, Germany, Britain, and France have
completed two important nuclear agreements with
Iran. In the second of these agreements, signed on
November 15, 2004, Iran pledged to temporarily
stop all of its uranium enrichment, conversion, and
reprocessing activities. In return, the Europeans
have agreed to address Iran’s security concerns and
expand commercial exchanges. The International
Atomic Energy Agency has endorsed the agreement.
It is unlikely that the question of Iran’s nuclear pro-
grams will be taken to the Security Council, as the
United States has advocated, so long as negotiations
continue between Iran and the Europeans. 
THE TALKING OPTION
If the Europeans can negotiate with Iran, why
not the United States? Iran appears ready to discuss
the future of Iraq as well as other security issues
with the United States. It remains uncertain for
Tehran whether a “tactical consensus” on Iraq could
blossom into a strategic consensus between Iran
and America, or at the least lead to a marked
improvement in US-Iran relations. President George
H. W. Bush’s enlightened policy of “goodwill will
beget goodwill” worked well during the Kuwaiti
conflict. There is no compelling reason to think it
cannot work again in post-Saddam Iraq or in US
negotiations with Iran about its nuclear program. 
Direct negotiations with Iran would help the
United States stabilize Iraq, Afghanistan, and the
Persian Gulf generally, contribute to negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinians, resolve a lin-
gering conflict between the European Union and the
United States about the future of Iran, and improve
America’s standing in the Islamic world. If President
Richard Nixon’s opening to China was his greatest
foreign policy legacy, President George W. Bush
might find his by creating an opening with Iran. 
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